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The Accountant and the Law *
By J. Harry Covington
To discuss the range of necessary knowledge which the man
engaged in any business or profession should possess is to bring,
up a topic of absorbing interest. Varied indeed are the views
of men of affairs toward the present-day habit of intense and
even narrow specialization in the acquisition of exact scientific
knowledge. It is not my purpose, however, today in my brief
matter-of-fact talk, to speculate upon the full range of the knowl
edge which you as public accountants should have. I want
simply to talk a bit about some things which you must know if
you are really entitled to be in full practice in your profession.
As the constantly expanding business affairs of our country
have become more and more complicated those professional
experts in various fields who deal with such affairs find a con
stantly increasing need of a good knowledge of sciences beyond
the domain of their own particular professions. The finished
trial lawyer must know something of most of the sciences if he
is intelligently to examine technical witnesses so as to get at the
truth. The accomplished patent lawyer must have a fair under
standing of mechanics, of chemistry and of electricity. The
surgeon must know something of mechanics, engineering and
electricity if he is to put to the best use the various instruments
and devices which are his aids in the alleviation of suffering.
So the public accountant, preparing an audit and report, the
truth and soundness of which must rest upon a foundation
of demonstrable facts, or conducting a hearing in which the
result of his examination and accounting picture is to be deter
mined by the probative value of the facts upon which the result
has been reached, should have a fair knowledge of the general
principles of the law.
The late Joseph H. Choate once gave an amusing definition of
the many-sided culture of a professional man on an occasion
when he was approached in a Swiss hotel by an English gentleman
who had sat opposite him at dinner. The Englishman said:
“We have been observing you, as an American, with much
*An address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants at
Washington, D.C., September 16, 1925.
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interest, and I want to ask you a very impertinent question,
if I may. What are you by occupation or profession? Won’t
you be good enough to tell me, because my wife says you are a
clergyman, my daughter insists you are an actor, and I say you
are a lawyer. We can’t all be right.” “Yes, you can,” in
stantly retorted Mr. Choate, “I am something of all three—
three in one. I preach a good deal, act a little, and practise
more or less law—which means that I am an American lawyer.
Tell your wife and daughter you all guessed right.”
In recent months you have had published in The Journal of
Accountancy an able address that dealt in most interesting
detail with the methods of procedure in federal tax appeals by
one who spoke with both the voice of authority and the knowl
edge of experience. You have also had recently published a
most scholarly and absorbing address on the accountant’s duty to
uncover questions of law, which deals admirably with the ethical
responsibility of the accountant to lay bare those legal problems
which come to his knowledge in the course of his labor in any
particular audit or investigation so that they may be rightly
settled by the appropriate legal agency. The remarkable
thing about those addresses is that both the authors presume
that the accountant who undertakes responsible work in ac
countancy—such work as entitles him to be considered in a
really professional service—must have, within limitations, a
knowledge of law.
Indeed, in that part of the accountant’s work which puts him
forward as the spokesman of his client in a public hearing of a
controversial character I make bold to say that he is not com
petent to act for his client unless he has a fair knowledge of the
probative value of facts. And such knowledge can be had only
through a clear comprehension of at least the more general rules
of that vital branch of procedural law, the law of evidence.
Of course, when any controversy is a legal one pure and
simple—make no mistake about it—no supplementary knowledge
of the law will enable one who is not a lawyer to undertake the
cause of a party to the controversy. In such cases the lawyer
is as much a necessity as is the surgeon for an operation on the
body. But in the cases where the accountant is abstractly sup
posed to be competent to deal with his client’s cause in con
troversy, in each concrete case he is still incompetent unless he
has undertaken to know something of the law of evidence just
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as the accomplished trial lawyer knows something, say, of
engineering or of medicine.
Now, the law of evidence is more largely the creature of
experience than logic. And, peculiarly enough, it is not so much
concerned with what is admissible in proof as with what is
inadmissible. To be admissable, evidence must be relevant, that
is, it must have a definite probative value as the result of experi
ence. In other words, facts which are offered to be proved must
not merely be related to the ultimate fact which is at issue in a
controversy, but they must also be such matters of fact as
according to human experience best and clearly tend to prove
the ultimate fact.
As that great master of the law of evidence, the late Professor
Thayer, of Harvard, once said:

“It must be noticed, then, that ‘evidence’ in the sense
used when we speak of the law of evidence has not the large
meaning imputed to it in ordinary discourse. It is a term of
forensic procedure; and imports something put forward in
a court of justice. Chiefly, it determines, as among proba
tive matters—matters in their nature evidential—what
classes of things shall not be received. This excluding
function is the characteristic one in our law of evidence.
Admissibility is determined, first, by relevancy—an affair
of logic and experience, and not at all of law; second, by the
law of evidence, which declares whether any given matter
which is logically probative is excluded.”
It follows that to a considerable extent the rules of the law of
evidence are purely arbitrary. They must, therefore, be studied,
comprehended and kept clearly in memory, without regard to
whether or not they seem responsive to rules of logic, by those
who are to use them. They are the indispensable guideposts
to the traveller along a road which is both winding and beset
with pitfalls.
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, a distinguished judge of the
high court of justice in England, and a great authority on the
law of evidence said that “the great bulk of the law of evidence
consists of negative rules declaring what, as the expression runs,
is not evidence.” That statement is a succinct declaration of a
fundamental conception of our jurisprudence. The English law
in the evolution of centuries has devised the one system of law
by which a definite issue is evolved by the pleadings in all con
troversies between litigants. With a clear issue of fact to be
269

The Journal of Accountancy

determined, and the legal rights or obligations of the litigants to
be settled by the judge in accordance with what is the outcome
of the issue of fact, only those facts are admissible which furnish
a practical basis of inference in ascertaining the fact in issue.
Those facts from which can be inferred the fact in issue must
also always be proved by the best evidence available. It can
thus be readily seen that quite naturally and in keeping with the
scientific development of our law a great body of rules, quite
incomprehensible to the layman, but both necessary and effective
in administering justice, have grown up. And that these rules
still exist and are rigorously enforced is conclusive as to their
necessity in the effective dispensation of justice in our courts.
To the critic, who cries aloud in the valor of ignorance, may be
quoted the words of Lord Erskine, great lawyer, orator and judge,
who once said: "No precedents can sanction injustice; if they
could, every human right would long ago have been extinct upon
the earth.”
It is not my purpose to give you an extended discourse upon
the rules of the law of evidence. They are, as you may have
already gathered, many and complex. But a few simple illustra
tions will, I think, indicate the necessity of knowing something
of those rules if one is to attempt to serve a client in any cause
where such rules are to be applied. There is the general rule
that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. That is to say, a state
ment made by a person who is not himself a witness has no
probative value as to the truth of the matter stated and may not
be testified to by one who heard him. To this rule, however,
there are innumerable exceptions. It is impossible to apply
one’s general reasoning powers to determine in what circum
stances a hearsay statement is in fact admissible. One must
know the rules. A simple exception is that an oral admission
made by a person against whom it is to be used is deemed to be
a relevant fact as against that person. On the other hand it is
not deemed to be a relevant fact in his favor.
Again, take the rule respecting the proof of a transaction be
tween two parties one of whom is dead. There is no rule of logic
which establishes to one’s mind the fact that the living person
may not be trusted to tell the truth concerning the transaction
and yet the rule justified by experience is that where one of two
parties to a transaction is dead the living party may not himself
testify to it. It therefore becomes necessary to prove the
270

The Accountant and the Law

transaction by some third party who himself has actual knowledge
of it.
Another exception to the hearsay rule is that declarations of
a deceased testator as to the contents of his will are deemed to
be relevant when his will has been lost and when there is a
question as to what were its contents. It is interesting to note
that, as a satisfactory rule of admissibility which has worked
in these cases, it is immaterial whether the declarations were
made before or after the making of the will.
Recently I came across an amusing instance of the strictness
with which the hearsay rule may be enforced. In some parts
of England the carrying of a corpse over a path or across a field
conferred a right of way ever after. In a case tried in Notting
hamshire, a witness testified that a funeral party had gone along
a certain path, over which a right of way was being claimed.
The opposing counsel asked the witness if he had seen a corpse
carried there, and he answered, no doubt truthfully, that he had
seen a coffin carried by four men. The counsel asked how he
knew that the coffin contained a corpse, and when the witness
declared that he had been told it did, the objection to the evi
dence as being hearsay was allowed, and a witness had to be
found who actually saw the corpse in the coffin, and the under
taker had to testify that the coffin had not been out of his sight
from the time he screwed down the lid until it left the house
for burial. This was certainly enforcing the hearsay rule to the
limit.
Controversies relating to the acts and liabilities of corporations
largely revolve around their books and documents. The rules
respecting the appropriate proof of the contents of such books
and the authenticity of such documents are necessarily strict.
So it is with opinion evidence. When such evidence may be
received and how to establish the qualifications of a witness who
is to give his opinion as an expert are matters not to be determined
by mere rules of seeming reason. Such questions are determined
by definite rules of the law of evidence which one must know much
as he knows his multiplication table.
Facts similar to but unconnected with the facts in issue are
logically irrelevant and under the general rule of evidence are
inadmissible. For example, when the question is whether or
not a man committed a certain crime, the fact that he formerly
committed another such crime is inadmissible evidence against
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him. But as an exception to the rule, when there is a question
whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course
of office or business according to which it naturally would have
been done is a relevant and admissible fact.
But, say many laymen, why all these peculiar rules? Are we
not much too legalistic in our methods of accomplishing the
distribution of justice? Indeed, I doubt not that some of you,
halted, confused and therefore annoyed by some legal barrier
you could not understand, have been impatient of the law’s
restraints. The answer is simple: The priceless heritage of orderly
liberty under the law has made for centuries the civilization of
the English-speaking peoples the most progressive and humane
in the world. That civilization has as its deep tap-root the vital
and scientific body of legal principles called the common law.
The common law, developed by the wisdom and learning of
English judges, has constantly expanded to admit new remedies
as the varied habits and activities of the people developed new
rights to be enforced, and the modes of procedure have as con
stantly been broadened and systematized so as to assure the
certain and impartial enforcement of the substantive law
itself.
When our forefathers established governments in America
they laid the foundations of these governments on the common
law. When difficulties grew up between them and the mother
country, they acted as their English ancestors had always acted
in their political troubles—interposed the common law as the
shield against arbitrary power. When the united colonies met
in congress in 1774, they therefore claimed the common law of
England as a branch of those “indubitable rights and liberties
to which the respective colonies are entitled.’’
That great American jurist, Chancellor Kent, has said:
“The common law of England, so far as it was applicable
to our circumstances, was brought over by our ancestors
upon their emigration to this country. The revolution did
not involve in it any abolition of the common law. It was
rather calculated to strengthen and invigorate all the first
principles of that law, suitable to our state of society and
jurisprudence. It has been adopted, or declared in force,
by the constitution of some of the states, and by statute in
others. And where it has not been so explicitly adopted,
it is nevertheless to be considered as the law of the land,
subject to the modifications which have been suggested and
to express legislative repeal.’’
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The common law has always had as its very heart a system of
procedure by which the courts, through rules of pleading and
evidence rigidly enforced, assure impartial justice to the rich and
the poor, the high and the low.
The immortal words of Magna Carta ring today—keynote of
the common law—as they did on that long-ago June day at
Runnymede when the barons wrested the great charter from
King John—justice freely without sale, fully without denial, speedily
without delay. And there will be no present-day distortion of
the science of the law, no abandonment of those sound rules of
procedure which make it what it is merely to give some wanton
wayfarer on its narrow but safe path a chance to wander to the
danger of those he seeks to guide.
To return to a consideration of the law of evidence I must
also remind you that not all determinations admitting or ex
cluding evidence are referable to the law of evidence. When a
judge rules that the testimony produced by a plaintiff in an
action for negligence is no evidence of negligence he is not making
an ordinary ruling that there is no evidence of a fact. He rules
that the acts proved do not constitute a ground of legal liability.
The man who knows the rules of evidence alone would be like a
babe in the woods in arguing the soundness or unsoundness of
that ruling. The trained lawyer who alone could cross swords
with the judge in such an instance must have a scientific mastery
of that elusive part of the substantive law known as the law of
torts.
Again—and this is a question that may well come up with
you in your accountancy practice—the general rule of the law of
evidence is that when a contract between parties has been re
duced to the form of a document signed by such parties no
evidence may be given of the terms or effect or operation of the
contract except the document itself. However, the existence of
any separate contemporaneous oral agreement on which the
document is silent, which is not inconsistent with its terms, may
be proved by oral evidence if from the circumstances of the case
the judge infers that the parties did not intend the document to
be a complete and final statement of the agreement between
them. When the judge admits or rejects the oral evidence he is
not making an ordinary ruling on a question of evidence; he is
ruling on one of the most involved and vexing questions known
to the substantive law of contract; he is interpreting the docu
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ment signed by the parties and determining whether from all
the circumstances surrounding its execution it is a full and com
plete agreement between them. No man who knows merely the
ordinary rules of evidence could for a moment discuss intelli
gently such a ruling.
By this time I presume you are wondering why I have told
you that as a genuinely educated professional accountant you
should have some general knowledge of the law, and particularly
some general conception of the rules of evidence, and then
apparently have tried to appall you with the idea of the mys
teriousness of the law. My purpose is, however, one I am sure
you will quickly appreciate. There is an old adage, "Let not
your sail be bigger than your boat.” It is an adage appropriate
to a vast variety of people, to none more so than to the man who
in this day of complex life seeks boldly “to rush in where angels
fear to tread.”
Making the application direct: When your client has a problem
that is really a legal one don’t try to be his counsel. Within the
clearly bounded realm of the substantive law you will need a
guide as much as he. If, however, his problem is primarily one
to be evolved through accountancy, but is nevertheless to be pre
sented to a public tribunal of any sort where you may appear as
his advocate, remember that the rules of evidence designed by
judicial experience to bring forth truth through acid test of strict
procedure will not be abrogated to aid you in your ignorance.
You must either get a good general knowledge of those rules or
else in honesty to your client and yourself not undertake to
appear in any forum where they are enforced.
And now, as a final word, I trust I may not be misunderstood
if I undertake to admonish you about the broad standards of
education and proficiency which should be maintained in your
profession. It is indeed a vain thing to discuss with you the
need for an expanding knowledge within the domain of the law
if you are not certainly thorough masters of all those subjects
intimately connected with accountancy.
You are truly a young profession. Your collective position
is still one which permits of much growth. No time-honored
tradition of culture and of service fixes your stature in the public
mind as it does that of the doctor whose technical skill has
ministered unto the lame and the halt through the ages, or as it
does that of the lawyer who has with professional mastery
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caused the science of jurisprudence through centuries of civiliza
tion to force justice eventually to the fore, or as it does that of
the astronomer whose scientific knowledge of the heavens long
ago opened the way for the fearless navigator to advance civiliza
tion over uncharted seas. On the contrary, within the memory
of many men here you have advanced from the status of glorified
bookkeepers to the enviable position you undoubtedly occupy
today. Even at this moment our department of labor, in the
enforcement of certain laws having to do with the classification
of learned professions, is unwilling to designate broadly public
accountants as members of a learned profession. Your public
position is therefore yet largely in your own control. The complex
mass of statutes in the forty-eight states which seek to regulate
in ways frequently inadequate, sometimes amazing, and occasion
ally incomprehensible, the practice of your profession will not
for many years be moulded into any such harmonious, intelligent
and rigid uniform statutory system as to enable you to say that
a state certificate to practise public accountancy is conclusive
evidence that you are a member of a learned profession. The
standards of education, efficiency and ethics which you establish
and maintain will therefore determine your right to be held in
public estimation as professional men.
And what an opportunity the American Institute of Account
ants has for continued service of this sort! It has undertaken to
maintain standards of its own. Those standards are fully in
keeping with the conception of the accountant as belonging
to a learned profession. Whatever others may do, regardless of
the variations and laxity of state laws pertaining to accountancy
let the Institute be concerned with advancing the education and
elevating the ethical tone of the accountant and it will occupy
a position of trust and confidence in the mind and heart of the
people from which no storm of opposition can dislodge it.
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